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STATE OF UTAH 
THE PRIDE CLUB, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Case No. 
12066 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' Statement of the Nature of the Case, Dis-
position in the Lower Court, and Statement of Facts cor-
rectly sets forth those matters. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondents seek affirmance of the summary 
judgment of the District Court of Salt Lake County in 
favor of Respondents. 
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APPELLANTS HA VE NO STANDING AND 
ARE IN NO POSITION TO RAISE THE QUES-
TION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEC-
TION"S 16-6-13.1 AND 16-6-13.5, U. C. A. 1953 
AS AMENDED, OR SECTION 16-613.7, U. C. A. 
1953. 
Under this Point I we are answering appellant's Point 
(a) The first two numbered sections require consent 
of the local authority to obtain a license from the Liquor 
Control Commission to operate a liquor store in a social 
club. Appellants assert that these sections of the statutes 
are unconstitutional because they contain no standards, 
limitations or guide lines for the local authority to follow 
and thus permits arbitrary and discriminatory action on 
the part of the local authority. 
We must emphasize that this case involves the control 
and regulation of the sale and consumption of liquor, a 
business which no one has an inherent right to conduct and 
one that is subject to strict regulation, and even prohibi-
tion, by the state. This factor must not be lost sight of in 
the proper disposition of this appeal as will be abundantly 
shown by the authorities which we will cite. 
The foregoing heading to this part of the brief could 
very well be stated in the words of this Court in State v. 
Kallas, 97 Utah 492, 94 P. 2d 414, wherein this Court 
stated: 
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This court will not listen to an objection made 
as to the constitutionality of an act by parties whose 
rights are not specifically affected. This court is 
committed to the rule that an attack on the validity 
of a statute cannot be made by parties whose inter-
ests have not been and are not about to be, preju-
diced by the operation of the statute. State ex rel. 
Johnson v. Alexander, 87 Utah 376, 49 P. 2d 408; 
Utah Mfrs ... Assn. v. Stewart, etc., et al., 82 Utah 
198, 23 P. 2d 229. 
There are no allegations that appellants have applied 
for and been denied the consent of any local authority. They 
simply say that if and when they do apply it is within the 
power of a local authority to deny or grant consent arbi-
trarily and discriminatorily. As will be shown, this is not 
a sufficient basis for questioning the constitutionality of 
the statutes here involved. 
In Utah Mfrs. Assn. v. Stewart, supra, this Court ruled 
on a challenge to the state liquor laws and stated as follows: 
Plaintiff contends the law is unreasonable and 
discriminatory. If this is true, we do not see how 
plaintiff can lawfulJy complain ... since there is no 
discrimination against it or other manufacturers 
who use alcohol. 
This case is cited with approval in Phi Kappa Iota 
Fraternity, et al. v. Salt Lake Cdy, 116 Utah 536, 212 P. 
2d 177, which holds in effect that one whose interests are 
not adversely affected by legislation may not raise the 
question of its constitutionality. 
In 2 A. L. R. 2d, p. 917, it is said: "It is settled that 
the validity of a statute or ordinance is open to attack only 
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by a person or organization whose rights are injuriously 
affected thereby." 
To same effect, see Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497; Mas-
sachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 487; Delaware Valley Con-
servation Assn. v. Resor, 392 F. 2d 331. 
3 McQuillin, Sec. 12.126, p. 526 : 
It is presumed that they (public officers) will 
properly discharge the duties of their office, and in 
the absence of proof to the contrary, they will be 
presumed to have acted in the exercise of their pow-
ers in the interest of the public and within the 
authority granted. 
A leading case on the subject under discussion is 
People ex rel. Liberman V. Vein De Carr, 175 N. Y. 440, 67 
N. E. 913. The decision of the New York court was 
affirmed in People ex rel. Liberman v. Van De Carr, 
199 U. S. 552, where defendant was convicted of sell-
ing milk without a permit. The ordinance of New 
York City provided that, "No milk shall be received, 
held, kept, offered for sale or delivery in the city of New 
York without a permit in writing from the Board of Health 
and subject to the conditions thereof." Defendant contended 
this ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Federal Constitution. He appealed to the Supreme Court 
of the United States contending the language of the or-
dinance vests arbitrary and absolute power in the Board 
of Health without declaring any lines or limits for the ex-
ercise of its prohibitive action and allows the board to load 
its permits with conditions the nature of which is not indi-
cated or limited. Defendant relied on Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
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118 U. S. 356. The Supreme Court sustained the conviction 
and said: 
These cases leave in no doubt the proposition 
that the conferring of discretionary power upon ad-
ministrative boards to grant or withhold permission 
to carry on a trade or business which is the proper 
subject of regulation within the police power of the 
state is not violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
There is no presumption that the power will be arbi-
trarily exercised, and when it is shown to he thus 
exercised against the individual, under sanction of 
state authority, this court has not hesitated to in-
terfere for his protection, when the case has come 
before it in such manner as to authorize the inter-
ference of a federal court. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
u. s. 356. 
We have then an ordinance which, as construed 
by the highest court of the state, authorizes the 
exercise of a legal discretion in the granting or 
withholding of permits to transact a business which, 
unless controlled, may be highly dangerous to the 
health of the community, and no affirmative show-
ing that the power has been exerted in so arbitrary 
and repressive manner as to deprive the appellant 
of his property or liberty without due process of 
law. In such cases, it is the settled doctrine of this 
court that no federal right is invaded, and no au-
thority exists for declaring a law unconstitutional 
duly passed by the legislative authority and ap-
proved by the highest court of the state. 
The granting of the authority to grant or withhold a 
permit in such a case involving a state regulated business 
under the police powers was held by both the New York 
court and the Supreme Court to carry with it the implied 
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restriction that it will be exercised lawfully and thus the 
question of constitutionality was eliminated. 
In Ex Parte Porterfield, 63 Ca1. 2d 524, 147 P. 2d 20, 
the court says : 
In California the presumption that licensing 
boards or officers will act fairly and impartially in 
the performance of their lawful duty is in accord-
ance with the federal rule in that regard. A grant 
of authority to a municipality carries with it the 
presumption that the council will perform its duty 
lawfully without discrimination. 
The court quotes from 19 Cal. Law Review as follows: 
The California case under discussion fortifies 
previous holdings in this state, and is in accord with 
the federal rule, that a grant of authority carries 
the implication that it will be exercised reasonably, 
fairly and lawfully. See People ex rel. Liberman v. 
Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 522, 26 S. Ct. 144, 50 L. Ed. 
305; Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 
U. S. 177, 305 S. Ct. 356, 54 L. Ed. 435; Hall v. 
Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U. S. 539, 37 S. Ct. 217, 61 L. 
Ed. 480; Ex Parte McManus, 151 Cal. 331, 90 P. 
702. The court expressly declares that, "the statute 
will be construed together with the constitutional 
provisions against discrimination." People v. Globe 
Train and Milling Co., 221 Cal. 121, 294 P. at page 
5. 
But in jurisdictions like California where such 
enactments are upheld through reading in constitu-
tional limitations a complainant may only have re-
lief under the statute by proving discrimination 
against himself. In the instant case, the plaintiff 
sets up no facts proving discrimination, but alleges 
that since the statute, on its face, did not prevent 
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unfair action it was invalid ... The case seems 
rather to be decided upon the sensible theory that 
administrative officers are sufficiently limited by 
reading into their authority constitutional limita-
tions, and in proper cases an adequate remedy 
against the misuse of discretion is provided by a 
review of their orders and rules. 
Under the preceding authorities, in the absence 
of evidence of an abuse of discretion, it will not be 
presumed the ordinance is void, merely because the 
statutory authority to enact ordinances for "regula-
tion and revenue" does not prescribe limitations of 
discretion on the part of the council. 
Mosher v. Beirne, 377 F. 2d 638: 
It has also been recognized that the conferring 
of discretionary power upon administrative boards 
to grant or withhold permission to carry on a trade 
or business which is the proper subject of regula-
tion within the police power of the state is not vio-
lative of rights secured by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. People ex rel. Liberma,n v. Van De Carr, 199 
U. S. 552, 26 S. Ct. 144, 50 L. Ed. 305, and that 
ordinances validly prohibiting the operation of cer-
tain businesses without first obtaining municipal 
permission do not deprive one of his property with-
out due process of law nor deny one the equal pro-
tection of the law. Fincher v. City of St. Louis, 194 
U. S. 361, 24 S. Ct. 673, 48 L. Ed. 1018. 
In 31 C. J. S., sec. 146, p. 329, is the following: 
It is also presumed as an element of the gen-
eral rule, that a public officer, in the discharge of 
his official duties, whether or not an oath has been 
required, acts fairly, impartially, and in good faith, 
and in the exercise of a sound judgment and discr~-
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tion, for the purpose of promoting the public good 
and protecting the public interest. 
In 12 A. L. R., p. 1435, is the following: 
It should also be remembered that the fact that 
a court has laid down one rule in one case, as, for 
instance, that a municipal ordinance granting arbi-
trary and uncontrolled discretion to city officers as 
to the granting of licenses or permits to carry on 
what is generally regarded as a useful and ordinar-
ily lawful business does not necessarily preclude the 
reaching of a contrary conclusion as to the validity 
of a grant of power with respect to the licensing of 
a business such as dealing in intoxicating liquors, 
the right to carry on which is generally regarded as 
a mere privilege, subject to arbitrary control or ab-
solute prohibition. 
On page 1447, the note states: 
It is also well settled that it is not ahvays neces-
sary that statutes and ordinances prescribe a spe-
cific rule of action, but, on the other hand, some 
situations require the vesting of some discretion in 
public officials, as for instance, where it is difficult 
or impracticable to lay down a definite, compre-
hensive rule, or the discretion relates to the admin-
istration of a police regulation and is necessary to 
protect the public morals, health, safety and general 
welfare. Citing the Liberrna.n case. 
This annotation is continued in 54 A. L. R. 1164 and 
92 A. L. R. 400. In the latter it is said, p. 410 : 
It may be noted that the modern tendency is to 
be more liberal in permitting grants of discretion to 
administrative bodies or officers in order to facili-
tate the administration of laws as the complexity of 
economic and governmental conditions increase. 
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The case of Yick Wo v. Hopkin.~, 118 U. S. 356, cited 
by appellants is not in point. There the petitioner had been 
denied a license to engage in the laundry business simply 
because he was Chinese. There was an actual invasion of 
of his right to carry on a lawful business. In Kotch v. 
River Port Pilot Comrs., 330 U. S. 557, 90 L. Ed. 1093, the 
court said that Yick Wo "was denied the right (to conduct 
his laundry business) solely because he was Chinese." 
All that can be said of appellant's position is that at 
some time in the future some one or more of them may be 
injured by a discriminatory action by a municipality refus-
ing to give its consent. This is to presume that the munici-
pality will act discriminatorily or arbitrarily, a presump-
tion which the authorities above cited hold may not be in-
dulged in. 
None of the appellants before this court has a lawful 
complaint. None of them has been denied local consent. 
Under the authorities above cited the duty to exercise a 
reasonable discretion and sound judgment in determining 
whether to grant or withhold consent is to be read into the 
statute as part thereof and consequently no constitutional 
question arises. One who deems himself discriminated 
against may have a court determine if such discrimination 
is a fact and so obtain relief against the body withholding 
consent. This is what Yick \Vo did and he obtained relief 
without striking down the legislative enactment under 
which the authority purported to act in denying him his 
right to conduct a laundry business. 
The case of Ashton v. Kentucky, 384 U. S. 195, cited 
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by appellants, involved a statute creating the crime of libel. 
The court held that the law under which the accused was 
convicted was given such a broad construction and was so 
vague in providing standards by which a publication should 
be determined to be a libel as to make it unconstitutional. 
Here was an attempt to define what would be a crime and 
punishable as such. The court held the act was too vague 
for that purpose. This holding has no bearing on the ques-
tion before this court. No crime is here involved. The ap-
pellants attempt to read into a statute regulating a business 
subject to regulation under the police power a rule of law 
governing the definition of a crime, something wholly for-
eign to the question involved. The court also indicated that 
the court must look more closely to see "lest under the guise 
of regulating conduct that is reachable by the police power, 
freedom of speech or of the press suffer." The court in 
Winters v. New York, 333 N. Y. 507, 68 S. Ct. 65, 82 L. Ed. 
840,says: 
The standards of certainty in statutes punish-
ing for offenses is higher than in those depending 
primarily upon civil sanction for enforcement. The 
crime must be defined with appropriate definite-
ness. There must be ascertainable standards of 
guilt. 
One of the cases cited by the court in Ashton v. Ken-
tucky, supra, Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553, clearly shows 
the distinction above made. There the court held that 
"when a statute, valid on its face, requires the issuance of 
a license or certificate to carry on a business or to follow a 
vocation one who is within the terms of the statute, but has 
failed to make the required application, is not at liberty to 
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complain because of his anticipation of improper or invalid 
action in administration. This principle, however, is not 
applicable where a statute is invalid upon its face and an 
attempt is made to enforce its penalties in violation of con-
stitutional rights. 
All of the cases cited by the court in Ashton v. Ken-
tucky to support its decision, cited on pages 16 and 17 of 
appellant's brief, involve statutes held to be too vague to 
justify criminal prosecution for a violation. 
The case of Graccio v. State of Penn., 382 U. S. 401, 
involved a statute which permitted the jury to impose costs 
upon a defendant though found not guilty of the charge on 
which he was tried. It fixed no standards to govern the 
jury in determining the amount of the costs to be imposed, 
but provided for imprisonment of the defendant if he failed 
to pay the costs imposed. The court said : "Whatever label 
be given the 1860 act, there is no doubt that it provides the 
state with a procedure for depriving an acquitted defendant 
of his liberty and property." This element is not involved 
in the instant case, first because plaintiffs have no property 
right that can be involved under the statute in question 
and, second, because the constitutional safeguards are to be 
read into said statutes as we have abundantly shown. 
The same is true as to the case of Jones v. Logan City, 
19 Utah 2d 169, 428 P. 2d 160, cited on page 19 of appel-
lant's brief. We emphasize again that in granting or deny-
ing the right to engage in the sale and consumption of liquor 
no property rights are involved. To engage in this business 
is a privilege which may be granted or withheld. Appel-
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lants seem to argue that the whole liquor control act and 
"where liquor may be stored, served, consumed and sold 
within the state" are involved in the two statutory provi-
sions under attack. On the contrary, those two sections 
concern only a social club having a liquor store on its prem-
ises. And only whether a permit for such a store is to be 
granted depends upon the consent of the local authority. It 
will be presumed that in determining whether to grant or 
deny consent the local authority will act reasonably and 
fairly in the interests of the public until the contrary is 
shown. 
(b) Appellants attack Section 16-6-13.7, U. C. A. 
1953, as being violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of the Federal Constitution that people shall 
be safe from unreasonable searches and seizures. 
The challenged section (which is quoted in appellant's 
brief, page 3), provides for inspection of the premises and 
books and records of the licensee at any time during tran-
saction of business by any member of the council, the com-
mission or any peace officer or investigator upon presenta-
tion of proper credentials. 
In Kellaher v. Minshull, 119 P. 2d 302, 11 Wash. 2d 
380, the statute governing small loans proYided that the 
supervisor may at any time investigate the loans, and busi-
ness and examine the books, accounts records and files 
therein and for that purpose the supervisor and his repre-
sentatives shall have free access to the offices and places 
of business, etc. The court held the Federal Fonrth Amend-
ment was not involved and as to the state constitution 
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which provided, "No person shall be disturbed in his private 
affairs, or his home invaded without authority of law", 
said: 
Constitutional provisions such as those con-
tained in the article and section just quoted are 
primarily designed to protect individuals in the 
sanctity of their homes and the privacy of their 
books and papers and they are not infringed by the 
enforcement of reasonable rules which have been 
adopted in the exercise of the police power for the 
protection of the public health, morals and welfare. 
24 R. C. L. 704, Searches and Seizures, Sec. 6; see 
also 56 C. J. 1160, Searches and Seizures, Sec. 12. 
In Financial Aid Corporation v. Wallace, 216 Ind. 114, 
23 N. E. 2d 472, the court upheld a similar statute which 
subjected the small loan operator to visitation and exam-
ination, the court said: 
The appellant claims that this provision 
amounts to an illegal search and seizure of the ap-
pellant's property. Regulatory provisions of this 
nature have been recognized so long that it would 
be folly to undertake to strike them down at this 
time. There is nothing in the act to violate Sec. 11, 
Article I of the Indiana Constitution. Sherman v. 
City of Fort Wayne, 127 Ind. 109, 26 N. E. 560, 11 
L. R. A. 318. 
It cannot be successfully contended that the act 
deprives the appellant of its property without due 
process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution. 
In the Sherman case it is said that the federal constitu-
tional provision on searches and seizures is "literally copied 
into our state constitution." 
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In 16 Am. Jur. 2nd, p. 313-314, Sec. 120, it is stated: 
It is established that one cannot invoke, in or-
der to defeat a law, an apprehem;ion of what might 
be done under it and which, if done, might not re-
ceive judicial approval; to complain of a ruling one 
must be the victim of it. 
In the footnote to this statement is the following: 
A defendant who has not been called on to give 
evidence against himself and whose person or house 
has not been subjected to any search has not the 
necessary interest to raise the question whether a 
statute under which he is being prosecuted violates 
the Bill of Rights with respect to self-incrimination 
and unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. 
Hill, 168 La. 761, 123 So. 317, 69 A. L. R. 574; State 
v. Baskowitz, 250 Mo. 82, 156 S. \V. 945. 
In State v. Hill, supra, the court said: 
Defendant has not yet been called on to give 
evidence against himsel, nor has any attempt been 
made to search his person or his house. Hence he 
has no interest in raising that question in the pres-
ent case. 
In view of the foregoing, we respectfully submit the 
appellants have no legal basis for their action. They do 
not have the standing or interest necessary to question the 
validity of the statutory provisions they attack. 
POINT II. 
SEC. 16-6-13.7, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
(1969) DOES NOT VIOLATE THE RIGHTS 
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GUARANTEED BY THE FOURTH AND FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENTS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION THAT PEOPLE SHALL BE 
SAFE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCHES 
AND SEIZURES. 
In a consideration of the issues involved in this appeal 
we remind the court that the Fourth Amendment applies, 
by its own terms, only to "unreasonable'' searches and 
seizures. This plainly indicates that not all searches and 
seizures are outlawed. ·what is reasonable must be decided 
in the light of each situation and circumstances and the 
purposes to be accomplished in any particular case. 
(a) The United States Supreme Court cases cited by 
appellant are not in point. 
It is well to examine the facts involved in the two 
Supreme Court cases cited by appellants. The first case, 
Camara V. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967), involved 
an ordinance of San Francisco providing for inspection of 
apartment houses to be made at least annually for possible 
violations of the city's housing codes. The city's inspector 
was told by the apartment manager that appellant leased 
the ground floor and was using it as a residence, which was 
contrary to the city code. The inspector asked permission 
to inspect the premises, which request was refused because 
of lack of a search warrant. The inspector returned again 
two days later, still without a warrant. He was again re-
fused. Some two weeks later two inspectors returned and 
informed appellant that he was required by law to permit 
inspection, citing the city ordinance requiring inspection 
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upon an inspector's showing proper credentials. Appellant 
still refused. He was later charged with refusing to permit 
inspection in violation of the ordinance. The ordinance 
made violation, disobedience or failure to comply with the 
provisions of the code a misdemeanor punishable by a fine 
not exceeding $500 or by imprisonment not to exceed six 
months, or both such fine and imprisonment. He was con-
victed and his conviction was sustained by the District 
Court of Appeals. The case was then appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court which overruled the earlier 
case of Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 (1959), which 
validated a similar ordinance dealing with inspections by 
a health officer with the result that to inspect appellant's 
premises a search warrant was held necessary and so the 
conviction was nullified. 
However, the Supreme Court in Camara did not hold 
that a search may not be made without a warrant in all 
cases. It carefully pointed out that public interest in other 
situations may require that no search warrant be obtained. 
It said as to that point: 
In assessing whether the public interest de-
mands creation of a general exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement, the question is 
not whether the public interests justifies the type 
of search in question, but whether the authority to 
search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in 
turn depends in part upon whether the burden of 
obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the gov-
ernmental purpose behind the search. See Schmer-
ber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 770-771. It has 
nowhere been urged that fire, health and housing 
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code inspection programs could not achieve their 
goals within the confines of a reasonable search 
warrant requirement. Thus we do not find the pub-
lic need argument dispositive. (Emphasis added.) 
It is clear from the facts of the case that the procure-
ment of a search warrant could have been obtained without 
in any manner jeopardizing the objective to be obtained by 
the search. The Court recognized that there are situations 
in which the securing of a search warrant would defeat the 
purpose of the search. The cited case of Schmerber in-
volved a liquor law violation. In that case the petitioner 
was convicted of drunk driving. He was arrested at the 
hospital where he was receiving treatment for injuries suf-
fered in an accident which occurred while he was driving 
the automobile involved. A blood sample was taken from 
him which showed him to be under the influence of alcohol. 
He refused to consent to the taking of the sample and ob-
jected to its introduction in evidence. On the question of 
the application of the Fourth Amendment prohibiting un-
reasonable searches and seizures, the Court there said: 
The officer, in the present case, might reason-
ably have believed that he was confronted with an 
emergency in which the delay necessary to obtain 
a warrant threatened 'the destruction of evidence.' 
Preston v. United States, 376 U. S. 364 (1964), 11 
L. Ed. 2d 777. We are told that the percentage of 
alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after 
drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate 
it from the system. Particularly in a case such as 
this, where time had to be taken to bring the ac-
cused to the hospital and to investigate the scene of 
the accident, there was no time to seek out a magis-
trate and secure a warrant. 
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It is apparent, therefore, that the Camara decision 
must be confined to its facts and that it is only authority 
against warrantless searches or inspections under munici-
pal fire, health and housing codes. It is not authority in-
sofar as a state's liquor law is concerned. This was expressly 
declared in the case of Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United 
States, -------- U. S. ________ , 90 S. Ct. 77 4, 25 L. Ed. 2d 60, 
( 1970. In that case federal agents, acting without 
a warrant, inspected the premises of a licensed New 
York liquor dealer for possible violations of federal laws, 
and, upon the dealer's refusal to unlock a storeroom, broke 
the lock and seized bottles of liquor. The dealer instituted 
an action to recover the liquor and suppress it as evidence. 
The applicable statutes gave the Secretary of the Treasury 
or his delegate broad authority to enter and inspect the 
premises of retail dealers in liquor. The Court says: 
We agree that Congress has broad power to 
design such powers of inspection under the liquor 
laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand. 
The general rule laid down in See v. City of Seattle, 
supra, at 545, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 947 - 'that adminis-
trative entry, without consent, upon the premises 
which are not open to the public may only be com-
pelled through prosecution or physical force within 
the framework of a warrant procedure' - is there-
! ore not applicable here. In See, we reserved de-
cision on the problems of 'licensing programs' re-
quiring inspection, saying they can be resolved 'on 
a case by case basis under the general Fourth 
Amendment standard of reasonableness' .... 
We deal here with the liquor industry long 
subject to close supervision and inspection. As re-
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spects that industry, Congress has broad authority 
to fashion standards of reasonableness for searches 
and seizures. Under existing statutes, Congress se-
lected a standard that does not include forcible entry 
without a warrant. It resolved the issue not by 
authorizing forcible, warrantless entries, but by 
making it an offense for a licensee to refuse ad-
mission to the inspector. 
Since forcible entry was not provided by Congress, 
only prosecution for failing to permit inspection being pro-
vided, the Court in Colonnade held the forcible entry with-
out a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. The infer-
ence is clear, however, that if Congress had provided for 
forcible entry such could have been made without a war-
rant. 
Chief Justice Burger in his dissenting opinion would 
have allowed the forcible entry absent specific provisions 
therefore: 
The majority, far from finding this search un-
reasonable and therefore illegal under the Fourth 
Amendment, holds only that it was not authorized 
by 26 U. S. C., Secs. 5146(b), 1606(a), and that 
therefore the liquor must be returned. While these 
statutes do not in express terms authorize forcible 
breaking and entering to seize liquor kept in viola-
tion of federal law, it is perfectly clear that they 
do not in express terms declare such seizure illegal, 
and in my opinion those provisions impliedly author-
ize exactly the type of official conduct involved here. 
I am confident that when Congress said that federal 
liquor agents could search without a warrant and 
further provided for fines if the owner refused to 
permit such a search, it also intended to authorize 
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forcible entry and seizure if that becomes neces-
sary. 
The case of See v. City of Seattle, 387 U. S. 541 
( 1967), involved a conviction for refusing to permit a rep-
resentative of the Seattle Fire Department to enter and 
inspect appellant's locked commercial warehouse without 
a warrant based on probable cause to believe a violation 
of the city ordinance existed therein. Appellant was con-
victed for refusing entry. The Court there applied to a 
business building the rule announced in the Camara case, 
supra, as to residential premises. 
However, as noted from the excerpt from the Colon-
nade case, supra, the court eliminates the See case as an 
authority in the instant case. In legislation involving liquor, 
the state legislature would have the same kind of broad 
powers as the Colonnade case ascribes to Congress. As 
stated by Chief Justice Burger in his dissent in that case: 
"Surely Congress was not unaware that pur-
veyors of liquor do not leave their wares or stores 
or reserve supplies lying casually about; on the con-
trary they keep supplies under lock in various ways, 
including lockers, cabinets, closets, or storerooms; 
this practice is so universal it can be judicially no-
ticed. Likewise it must be conceded that the legis-
lature was aware of the fact that to require a search 
warrant after entry was refused would defeat the 
whole purpose of the inspection as all unlawful acts 
or conditions existing at the time would be aban-
doned or erased while the warrant was being ob-
tained. As stated in the Camara case, the question, 
in determining whether the public interest requires 
a warrantless search, ''depends upon whether the 
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burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate 
the governmental purpose behind the search." 
Appellants further rely upon the case of Vagabond 
Club v. Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 2d 318, 445 P. 2d 691 
(1968). The decision of the majority in this case relies 
upon the Camara and See cases as dispositive of the ques-
tion of the invasion of the Fourth Amendment by an in-
spection without a warrant. The Court in Vagabond applied 
to a situation involving inspections under the liquor law the 
rule those two cases applied to a residence and a business 
establishment without any discussion of the difference be-
tween the two kinds of inspections and the public interest 
to be subserved by such inspections. As we have already 
shown, the United States Supreme Court in the Colonnade 
cases held the distinction was so substantial that the rule 
announced in those cases was not applicable to a case in-
volving inspections in connection with the liquor business 
and upheld the statute providing for inspections without 
a warrant. 
Appellants also cite Salt Lake City v. Wheeler, 24 Utah 
2d 112, 466 P. 2d 838 (1970), in which case the majority 
of this Court held the city ordinance which provided that, 
as to taverns licensed by the city, the "police department 
shall be permitted to and have access to all premises li-
censed or applying for licenses under this chapter, and 
shall make periodic inspections of said premises and report 
its findings to the board of commissioners", was unconsti-
tutional. This Court there held the decision in the Vaga-
bond case was dispositive of the matter. What we have 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
said concerning the Vagabond case applies equally to the 
Wheeler case. 
The Court made a point of the fact that the inspection 
could be made at any time under the ordinance and was 
not limited to business hours. It concludes that such in-
spections unlimited as to time seems "to explode any mythi-
cal distinction between 'browsing' inspection and 'bruising' 
search, so far as the Fourth Amendment concepts are con-
cerned." The statute attacked in the instant case specific-
ally limits the inspection to times when the establishment 
"is open for the transaction of business to its members." 
In this important particular the instant case differs from 
the Wheeler case. 
The Court there asks, "What is wrong or onerous about 
requiring a warrant", seemingly ignoring the well-known 
fact that all signs of violations could and probably 
would be removed during the interim required to se~ 
cure a warrant. That is the distinguishing fact between in-
spections under the liquor lavv's and inspections under the 
health and fire codes and makes the inspection reasonable. 
To require a warrant before inspection would emasculate 
the purpose for issuing the warrant. As to this important 
element, the Court was silent. To us it is the basic element 
that must be considered to properly dispose of the issue in-
volving the Fourth Amendment. 
In Hurless v. Department of Liquor Control, 136 
N. E. 2d 736 (1965), the statute, G. C. Sec. 6064-
63, authorized an ins11ection or search of the licensed 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
23 
premises without a search warrant. As to this statute the 
Court says: "The necessity of legislation such as is embod-
ied in G. C. Sec. 6064-63 to the proper enforcement of the 
Liquor Control Act is self-evident. Such a provision re-
stricted to the premises of permit holders manifestly does 
not contemplate an unreasonable search or seizure." 'l'he 
Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed this decision 164 Ohio St. 
492, 132 N. E. 2d 107 (1956). 
We wish to emphasize the all important proposition 
that the Fourth Amendment is directed only against un-
reasonable search and seizure. What is unreasonable in one 
situation may not be in another. As stated in the Colonnade 
case, "In See, we reserved decisions on the problems of 
'licensing programs' requiring inspection, saying they can 
be resolved on a case-by-case basis under the general Fourth 
Amendment standard of reasonableness." In this connec-
tion we quote what is said and relied upon in the Colonnade 
case: 
The government, emphasizing that the Fourth 
Amendment bars only 'unreasonable searches and 
seizures', relies heavily on the long history of the 
regulation of the liquor industry during pre-Fourth 
Amendment days, first in England and later in the 
American colonies. It is pointed out, for example, 
that in 1660 the precursor of modern day liquor 
legislation was enacted in Eng]and which allowed 
commissioners to enter, on demand, brewing houses 
at all times for inspection. Massachusetts had a 
similar law in 1692. And in 1791, the year in which 
the Fourth Amendment was ratified, Congress im-
posed an excise tax on imported distilled spirits and 
on liquor distilled here, under which law fec1,eral 
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officers had broad powers to inspect distilling prem-
ises and the premises of importers without a war-
rant. From these and later laws and regulations 
governing the liquor industry, it is argued that Con-
gress has been most solicitous in protecting the 
revenue against various types of fraud and to that 
end has repeatedly granted federal agents power to 
make v arrantless searches and seizures of articles 
under the liquor laws. 
The Court recognized the special treatment of 
inspection laws of this kind in Boyd v. United 
States, 116 U. S. 616, 624, 29 L. Ed. 7 46, 7 48, 6 S. 
Ct. 524 ... in the case of excisable or dutiable arti-
cles, the government has an inherent interest in 
them for the payment of the duties thereon, and 
until such duties are paid has a right to pursue and 
drag them from concealment ... 
As this act was passed by the same Congress 
which proposed for adoption the original amend-
ments to the Constitution, it is clear that the mem-
bers of that body did not regard searches and seiz-
ures of this kind as 'unreasonable' and they are 
not embraced within the prohibition of the amend-
ment. 
We respectfully submit in view of the foregoing that 
while the writer of the opinion in the Wheeler case stated 
the Colonnade case was no comfort to the city in that case, 
the Colonnade case is actually dispositive of the issue now 
before the court and upholds the constitutionality of Sec-
tion 16-6-13.7. 
(b) With no provision for criminal prosecution for 
refusing entry on request, the statute here invol1,ed is valid. 
There is another important aspect to be considered. 
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The Appellants quote only a subdivision of Section 16-6-
13.7 and failed to quote the first part of the section which 
begins as follows : 
Each applicant for a license under the provi-
sions of this chapter by accepting a license issued 
hereunder, or claiming the right under this chapter 
to store or permit the consumption of liquor on its 
premises, agrees and consents to abide by the fol-
lowing conditions and requirements. 
Then follow 19 different conditions and requirements, in-
cluding the seventh quoted in appellants' brief. Further, 
unlike the laws involved in the Camara, See and Colonnade 
cases, there is no penalty fixed for refusing entry. The 
last sentence of the section provides : 
Failure on the part of the licensee, club offi-
cers, managing agent, members or employees to 
adhere to the above conditions shall constitute 
grounds for the suspension or revocation of any 
license issued under this chapter. 
Section 16-6-13.11 provides that before a license may be 
revoked or suspended for a period of more than 30 days a 
public hearing shall be held. 
These provisions in the statute, in question thus dis-
tinguish the instant case from the Camara, See, Vagabond 
and Wheeler cases and bring it within the· principle of the 
case of Camden County Beverage Co. v. Blair, 46 F. 2d 648 
(N. J., 1930). In that case the act involved gave authority 
to the commission, in case of violation of the conditions of 
the permit to manufacture beer, ale or wine, to hold a hear-
ing and if the permittee has been guilty of violating any 
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laws to revoke the permit. Such a hearing was pending 
when the permittee brought an action to suppress all evi-
dence obtained by an alleged illegal search and seizure in 
either the penc~ing proceeding or any other proceeding. The 
Court says: 
In my opm10n, the complainant is not, under 
the present proceedings now pending against it, 
entitled to invoke the provisions of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments, to interfere with the investiga-
tions being made by government officers for the 
purpose of ascertaining whether the complainant is 
entitled to confidence, and to continue to exercise 
the right to manufacture its product under govern-
ment permission. None of the cases which I have 
been able to find extends the protection of these 
amendments to cases of this character. 
There the regulations of the Prohibition Department 
gave the administrator and other officers authority to in-
spect the premises of the permit holder at any and all times 
not inconsistent with the conduct of the business. The Court 
points out that search warrants are not available in a civil 
proceeding but are confined to cases of public prosecutions 
instituted and pursued for the suppression of crime or the 
detection and punishment of criminals. 
Under Sec. 16-6-13.7 and Sec. 16-6-13.11 the only pro-
ceedings that can be taken against a club that refuses entry 
upon request is a hearing before the Liquor Control Com-
mission to determine whether the license of the club should 
be revoked or suspended for failure to adhere to this con-
dition of the license. Inspections conducted to determine 
whether grounds exist for revoking or suspending the li-
cense do not come within the Fourth Amendment. 
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( c) Engaging in the storage and consumption of 
liquor is a privilege and requires the licensee to observe 
the conditions imposed by law for the obtaining of the li-
cense and waives the right to demand a search warrant. 
By applying for and obtaining the license the licensee 
agrees to permit entry upon its premises as provided in 
sub-section 7 quoted in appellants' brief. This, in effect, 
waives his right to require a search warrant. The procure-
ment of a license by a nonprofit corporation to permit its 
members to store and drink liquor on its premises is not 
a right but a privilege that may be granted or withheld by 
the state. (See also Point IV (b), infra.) Section 16-6-
13.1 ( 4) provides: " ( 4) The so-called 'locker system' for 
the storage and serving of intoxicating liquors shall be 
legal in this state only when operated by a nonprofit cor-
poration m compliance with the terms and provisions of 
this chapter and the provisions of the Utah Liquor Control 
Act of 1969, and the regulations of the commission adopted 
thereunder." The privilege thus granted is not, as counsel 
states in his brief, "the privilege of organizing a social club 
and maintaining rooms for that social club", but is the 
privilege to store and consume liquor on the club's or cor-
poration's premises. Without this privilege being granted, 
there is no right granted to the corporation to permit the 
storage and consumption of liquor on its premises by its 
members. 
As stated by Justice Ellett in his dissenting opinion in 
State v. Salt Lake City, the Vagabond case: 
If the establishment desires to have liquor 
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consumed by its members and guests, it must com-
ply with the law which grants the privilege. One 
requirement is that peace officers have the right to 
enter the clubrooms and meeting rooms for the pur-
pose of determining whether any laws or ordinances 
are being violated. The officer is not entering to 
make a search. No search is contemplated by the 
ordinance or by the statute. He simply enters to 
see what everybody else in there sees; whether the 
law is being violated." 
He further states the See case is not in point, as we 
have already demonstrated, and continues: 
The case with which we are here concerned 
does not involve a person who is accused of crime 
for denying entrance by an inspector into private 
property which he owns and has a right to own 
without license or leave. Rather, we are here con-
sidering the question of whether one who seeks the 
right to operate a club where liquor is to be con-
sumed can enjoy that right without complying with 
the statutory conditions precedent thereto. 
It is not a matter of bargaining with the state, sur-
rendering a constitutional right by the licensee in order 
to secure a license. It is rather a consent to compliance by 
the licensee with the state's requirements in order to obtain 
a right to which it otherwise would not be entitled. The 
club can organize as a nonprofit corporation, and choose its 
members and carry on all the social or other activities 
which such an organization desires. But it may not, with-
out complying with the requirements of the law, engage 
in the consumption and storage of liquor, for the state has 
assumed complete jurisdiction over the traffic in liquor, 
something it has unquestioned authority to do. 
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This Court has held in Utah Mfrs. Assn. v. Stewart, 
82 Utah 198, 23 P. 2d 229 (1933), "There is no common 
law right on the part of any person to sell intoxicating 
liquor. The right to sell liquor is not one of the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States which the 
states are forbidden to abridge." The Court quotes from 
19 R. C. L. 14, " 'However partial it may seem, the state 
can exercise a monopoly of any business that is inherently 
dangerous to society and for that reason may lawfully be 
prohibited by it on the grounds of public policy, without 
violating any constitutional inhibitions, because no person 
possesses an inherent right to engage in any employment, 
the pursuit of which is necessarily detrimental to the pub-
lic.' " 
In Randles v. Washington State Liquor Control Board, 
33 Wash. 2d 688, 206 P. 2d 1209, 9 A. L. R. 2d 531 (1949), 
the Court said : 
There is no natural or constitutional right to 
sell liquor or engage in the business of selling or 
dispensing intoxicating liquor. The state under its 
police power may prohibit entirely the carrying on 
of such business and may regulate it in such man-
ner as may be deemed advisable. The times when, 
the places where, and the persons to whom it may 
be sold may be determined by the state. The privi-
lege of dispensing intoxicating liquor may be given 
to some and denied to others. In considering the 
claims of discrimination and the distinction be-
tween a lawful business which a citizen has the 
right to engage in and one in which he may engage 
only as a matter of grace of the state must be con-
stantly in mind. There is such a vast field of au-
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thority on the subject that we shall content our-
selves with citing a few of the cases decided by 
this court and leading cases decided by the United 
States Supreme Court. Then follows several cita-
tions. 
In Zap v. United States, 328 U. S. 624 (1946), the 
petitioner entered into contracts with the United States 
to do certain work. The contract provided that petitioner's 
accounts and records shall be open at all times to the gov-
ernment. In his absence the government representatives 
examined his records and found a check for $4,000 which 
should have been for $2,500. He sought to suppress this 
check under the Fourth Amendment. The Court says : 
But these rights (under the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments) may be waived. When petitioner, in 
order to obtain the government's business, specific-
ally agreed to permit inspection of his accounts and 
records, he voluntarily waived such claim to privacy 
which he otherwise might have had as respects busi-
ness documents related to those contracts. 
One of the conditions to which an applicant for a li-
cense to operate as a liquor locker club must agree is that 
it consent to inspection by peace officers and others during 
business hours to inspect the entire clubhouse, club quar-
ters and all books and records of the licensee. The members 
also agree to the inspection of their lockers. This, in effect, 
is a waiver of the right to require a search warrant to make 
an inspection. If the club desires a license as a liquor locker 
club, it must give this consent. It isn't a matter of two 
parties bargaining. The club is not entitled, as a matter of 
right, to a license. The state has specified the conditions 
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under which the privilege of operating a liquor locker club 
will be granted, and, having accepted the privilege, the club 
agrees to the terms under which the privilege is granted. 
This is precisely the same situation as is involved in the 
Zap case. There, too, the contractor had no alternative but 
to consent to an inspection if he desired to do business with 
the government. 
In Manchester Press Club v. State Liquor Commission, 
200 A. 407, 89 N. H. 442 (1938), the statute provided that 
any member of the commission may at any time enter any 
place of business where liquor is sold or manufactured. The 
Court says: 
The contention that the regulation is invalid 
on the ground that it violates the protection of the 
federal and state constitutions from unreasonable 
search, confuses between rights and privileges. No 
one may sell intoxicating liquor against the state's 
consent, and if consent is granted, it may be on such 
terms and conditions as the state attaches thereto. 
Acceptance of the license is an acceptance of the 
requirements to be observed by the licensee. The 
requirements impose the obligation to observe them, 
since the obligation is one voluntarily assumed in 
return for the privilege. 
To the same effect, see State of N eiu Jersey v. Zur-
awski, 89 N. J. Super. 488, 215 A. 2d 564 (1964); Zukowski 
v. State, 167 Md. 549, 175 A. 595; Oklahoma Alcoholic Bev-
erage Com. Ed. v. ]lfrCulley, 877 P. 2d 568 (Okl., 1963); 
Fischer v. State, 195 Mel. 477, 74 A. 2d 34 (1950). 
(d) Under licensing statutes covering a business reg-
ulated by law tlie right under the Fourth Amendment to 
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a search warrant is waived by accepting the license. 
In 79 C. J. S., Sec. 62, p. 819, is the following: 
The constitutional immunity (searches and 
seizures) is sometimes waived by a person when 
he engages in a business which is regulated by law, 
the acceptance of a license to engage in such busi-
ness being a necessary acceptance of the statutory 
conditions and an implied waiver of the constitu-
tional immunity to that extent. 
The following authorities are cited which support the 
text: 
Bowles v. Misle, 64 F. Supp. 835 ( 1946), in which the 
Court says: 
The immunities of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments are not absolute but are rather subject 
to waiver and he who enters into, or continues in, 
a business subject to official regulation voluntarily 
submits his business records and papers to such 
visitorial examination as the law contemplates, and 
in that measure waives his constitutional immuni-
ties of privacy in respect of his papers and against 
compulsory testimony. 
State v. Hall, 164 Tenn. 548, 51 S. W. 2d 851 (1932). 
The statute required as a condition to taking wild animals 
and birds that the hunter permit the state game warden or 
his deputy to inspect and count the animals, wild birds, 
wild fowl and fish to ascertain whether the requirements 
of the act were being faithfully complied with. The Court 
says: 
The constitution does not prohibit searches in 
general, but only those that are unreasonable . . . 
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No one has an absolute property right in game 
or fish while in a state of nature, and the right to 
take them may be restricted or prohibited, and, 
when granted or exercised, it is a privilege. 
This being true, we see no reason why the 
state may not annex to this privilege any condition 
and limitation it sees fit. If the sportsman is un-
willing to avail himself of the privilege accorded 
him, upon the terms and provisions prescribed, he 
may decline the invitation, but he cannot enjoy the 
benefits of this act without submitting to its bur-
dens and restrictions. 
The Court quotes with approval the above excerpt 
from Corpus Juris and cites several cases from other jur-
isdictions in support of its position. One is Wibmer v. 
State, 182 Wis. 303, 195 N. W. 936 (1923), in which it was 
held that the acceptance of a license to sell nonintoxicating 
liquors under statute is an acceptance of the statutory con-
ditions as to inspection of the premises by police or pro-
hibition officers of the premises upon which the nonintoxi-
cating liquors are kept. Says the Court: 
The acceptance of the license is necessarily an 
acceptance of the accompanying statutory condi-
tions and as to the premises is an implied waiver of 
the search and seizure provisions of the constitu-
tion. 
In Plainos v. State, 131 Tex. Cr. 367, 100 S. W. 2d 367 
( 1936), the Court says: 
In the absence of the power to make reason-
able and proper inspections of the premises of the 
licensee, the object and purpose of the Liquor Con-
trol Act would be emasculated ... 
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Appellant applied for and accepted his license 
subject to the requirement that he submit to in-
spections of his licensed premises by the duly au-
thorized agents of the Liquor Control Board. Hence, 
appellant was in the attitude of consenting to the 
search without the issuance of a search warrant. 
To the same effect, see Plainos v. State, 132 Tex. Cr. 
110, 102 S. vV. 2d 217 ( 1937); United States v. Cardiff, 95 
F .. Supp. 206 (D. C., 1951); United States v. Rabicoff, 55 
F. Supp. 88 (D. C. W. D. Mo., 1944); State v. Putzke, 7 
Ohio App. 2d 118, 218 N. E. 2d 627 (1966); Tucker v. State, 
244 Md. 488, 224 A. 2d 111 (1966). 
In 47 Am. Jur., p. 510, Sec. 13, is the following: 
The use of a search warrant to prevent and 
detect crime is a valid exercise of the police power 
of the state. The constitutional provisions have no 
application to reasonable rules and regulations 
adopted in the exercise of the police power for the 
protection of the public health, morals and welfare. 
Therefore, the inspection of a place of business dur-
ing business hours, in the enforcement of reason-
able regulations in the exercise of the police power, 
is not a violation of the guaranty against searches 
and seizures. 
In Mansbach Scrap Iron Co. v. City of Ashland, 235 
Ky. 265, 30 S. W. 2d 968 (1930), an ordinance was upheld 
as constitutional which required junk dealers to consent 
to inspection and search of premises as a prerequisite to 
obtaining a license to engage in such business. 
The case of State v. Nolan, 161 Tenn. 293, 30 S. W. 2d 
601 (1930), involved a law regulating barber shops. The 
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Court held the law was not violative of the constitutional 
provision against unreasonable searches and seizures say-
ing: 
No search or seizure in a sense protected 
against by the Constitution is provided for. Inspec-
tion of a place of business during business hours, in 
the enforcement of reasonable regulations in the 
exercise of the police power is not a violation of this 
constitutional right. (Emphasis added.) 
As to "licensing programs", we repeat what the Court 
said in the Colonnade case: "In See, we reserved decisions 
on the problems of 'licensing programs' requiring inspec-
tions saying they can be resolved on a case by case basis 
under the general Fourth Amendment standard of reason-
ableness", clearly indicating the rule announced in the See 
case did not apply to situations involving licensing. 
We respectfully submit that it is apparent the decision 
of the majority in the Vagabond and Wheeler cases did not 
fully consider the legal propositions to which we have re-
ferred and which must be considered in properly disposing 
of the instant case. The Camara and See cases, upon which 
the majority relied as dispositive of the Vagabond and 
Wheeler cases, are not in point. 
To permit an inspection of the premises only by a 
warrant based on probable cause to believe that the law has 
been violated would completely frustrate what appears to 
be the main purpose of the law, to prevent illegal activity 
in the first place. Private locker clubs must allow law en-
forcement officers to be present whenever the club is open 
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for the transaction of business to prevent violations of the 
liquor laws from occurring since such violations would 
clearly be much less likely to occur when an officer is 
present. 
The Fourth Amendment is not violated by the statute 
in question as is abundantly shown by the authorities we 
have cited. 
POINT III. 
§ § 16-6-13.1 AND 16-6-13.5, UTAH CODE ANN. 
(1969), RELATING TO THE REQUIREMENT 
OF LOCAL CONSENT TO SELL OR DISPENSE 
INTOXICATING LIQUORS ARE NOT UNCON-
STITUTIONALLY VAGUE. 
(a) Local pol-ice regulation matters are properly left 
to the localities. 
Appellant argues that the "local consent" requirements 
in Sections 16-6-13.1 ( 6), 13.5, Utah Code Annotated ( 1969), 
violate Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 24, which re-
quires that " ... all laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation." Appellants claim that there is a viola-
tion of Article I, Sec. 24 because there can be de facto pro-
hibition in any city or county of the state that does not give 
consent for the licensing of private nonprofit liquor clubs. 
(See Point II of appellant's brief.) 
This Court heard and rejected a similar claim in 
State v. Briggs, 46 Utah 288, 146 Pacific 261 (1915). 
Briggs was convicted for making an unlawful sale of in-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~7 
toxicating liquor. One of the bases for the appeal was that 
the statute under which Briggs had been convicted was 
unconstitutional because the local option provision violated 
Utah Constitution, Article I, Sec. 24. The Court in Briggs 
found no violation of Article I, Sec. 24. In doing so it relied 
primarily on Peterson v. Petterson, 42 Utah 271, 30 Pac. 
231 ( 1913). The Court in Peterson found that Sec. 20, 
Compiled Laws of Utah (1907) was not in violation of the 
constitutional requirement that "all laws of a general na-
ture shall have a uniform application." 
(b) There is a strong presumption that local officials 
will exercise their discretion within constitutional bounds. 
In considering the validity of the act it must also be 
kept in mind that there is a strong presumption in favor 
of the constitutionality of statutes and in favor of the con-
stitutionality of the enforcement. This Court has repeat-
edly held that enactments of the constituted legislative 
authority are presumed to be valid and constitutional. This 
presumption will prevail in the absence of a strong showing 
of constitutional infirmity. See State v. Briggs, (supra). 
Appellants urge that the challenged provisions are un-
constitutional because no standards are prescribed for the 
granting of local consent. In the language of the appellants, 
clubs are left "at the mercy of the local authority's whimsi-
cal discretion." (Brief of Appellants, p. 15.) It is further 
stated that: "The existence of such a vague requirement 
precludes due process of law and permits discriminatory 
and unequal treatment of those similarly situated." Id. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In so arguing, appellants ignore the clear rules of con-
struction that presumes that officials administering an act 
will proceed in a manner which will not be unconstitutional 
and that statutes, when differing interpretations are pos-
sible, should be given the interpretation that will uphold 
constitutionality. There is nothing in the statute which 
"precludes" due process of law. Indeed, the presumption 
is that the local authority will act in a constitutional man-
ner by guaranteeing due process and equal protection when 
deciding to grant, deny, or revoke local consent. (See, e.g., 
Lieberman V. Van De Carr, 199 U. S. 552 (1905) and 
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86 (1870) .) 
The fact that the delegation of authority to grant or 
deny local consent was not accompanied by substantive and 
procedural standards is irrelevant to the inquiry. The pre-
sumption of procedural fairness has been noted and this 
is the only alleged defect. 
Each city and county should have some control over 
the location of locker clubs within its jurisdiction. The 
numerous areas of local concern are the location of clubs 
with respect to zoning laws and schools, churches, parks, 
other clubs, residential areas, etc., compliance with local 
health and sanitation codes, and compliance with fire regu-
lations. The local authority is likely to have the most accu-
rate and recent records of arrests and misconduct of the 
persons applying for consent. Inasmuch as the needs and 
circumstances vary from one community to the next, it 
would be virtually impossible for the legislature to adopt 
standards for each locality within the state. 
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The Utah Supreme Court as early as 1891 ruled on 
the standards presumed with a delegation of authority. 
In Perry v. Oity Council of Salt Lake City, 7 Utah 
143, 25 P. 739. This court considered an applica-
tion for mandamus by one who was denied a liquor li-
cense by the city council. After discussing the various 
community interests concerning the location of liquor es-
tablishments, the court discussed the nature of the delega-
tion to the city council. 
"The charter confers the power to regulate the 
traffic upon the city, without expressly requiring 
it to be exercised by ordinance. But it is said that 
the councilmen may act from mere whims, caprice, 
partiality, or prejudice unless the regulation is by 
ordinance. The court should assume that public 
officers will act from proper motives until the con-
trary appears. It is also claimed that the court 
must presume that the council acted arbitrarily or 
without sufficient reason in refusing the license, be-
cause no reason appears upon its record. The court 
will not assume that the council refused the license 
arbitrarily, and without suffic-ient reason, without 
some proof. Being public officers, and acting under 
the sanction of an oath, the court will assume that 
they acted laiofully until the contrary appears. (25 
P. at 741, emphasis added.) 
The doctrine of presumption of legal and constitutional 
conduct in the absence of absolutely definitive standards 
was more recently enunciated by the California Supreme 
Court in In Re Petersen, 51 Cal. 2d 177, 331 P. 2d 24 
( 1958). Petersen was arrested for violating the police code 
of the city of San Francisco by parking his taxicab in a 
taxi zone reserved for another cab company. In his petition 
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for habeas corpus, Petersen alleged that the statute which 
allows for exclusive stands at the discretion of the chief of 
police and the adjacent property owner is unconstitutional. 
Specifically, it was urged that: 
"(3) The provision which grants the chief of 
police discretion to designate exclusive stands fails 
to prescribe any standards to guide him in that re-
spect." 331 P. 2d at 27. 
There were no express standards for the chief of police 
to follow in designating taxicab stands. The court discussed 
the presumption and requirements when express standards 
are not provided. 
"The absence of express standards in such sit-
uations does not mean that the licensing agency 
may act arbitrarily or oppressively; it is presumed 
that the agency will duly perform its public duty, 
but an abuse may be shown and relief obtained in 
the courts ... 
"Moreover, standards for administrative action 
can sometimes be found by implication. In Rescue 
Army v. Municipal Court, 28 Cal. 2d 460, 471, 171 
P. 2d 8, where an ordinance requiring a permit was 
involved, we held that sufficient standards were in-
herent in the reasons which must have led to the 
adoption of the ordinance." (331 P. 2d at 29.) 
Appellant contends that the "local authorities have in-
terpreted § § 16-6-13.1 and 16-6-13.5 Utah Code Ann. 
( 1969), to mean that they may whimsically revoke their 
consent, as well as grant it, and the liquor control commis-
sion considers any revocation of local consent conclusive 
grounds for license revocation." (Appellants' brief, Point 
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III, p. 26.) There is not even an allegation, aside from a 
total lack of evidence that any party to this action has 
had any license revoked by reason of the local consent 
being revoked. Furthermore, there is nothing in the 
applicable statutes which gives local authorities the power 
to revoke consent once given. Also, there is no proof 
of any such position being taken by the Liquor Commission 
and their counsel is advised by them that no such position 
has ever been taken by them. This points up the importance 
and wisdom of the legal principles involving standing set 
forth under Point I above. This Court should refuse to 
base its decision on a hypothetical set of facts. To do other-
wise is to invite needless challenges to every legislative 
enactment to avoid fanciful injuries which are highly specu-
lative at best. 
In the present case it is clear that there are implied 
standards for the granting and denial of local consent. 
Whether expressly stated in the delegating statute or not, 
the requirements of fairness and equal treatment are im-
pliedly placed on actions by the local authority. In the ab-
sence of any allegation and proof of violation of these stan-
dards, appellants' case must fail. 
POINT IV. 
§§ 16-6-13.1 AND 16-6-13.5 UTAH CODE ANN. 
(1969), IN PROVIDING FOR NO HEARINGS 
DO NOT DENY DUE PROCESS SINCE IN 
UTAH A LIQUOR LICENSE IS ONLY A PRIVI-
LEGE REGULATED UNDER THE POLICE 
POWER AND NOT "PROPERTY" WITHIN 
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THE MEANING OF THE DUE PROCESS 
CLAUSE. 
Appellants contend that the provisions in § § 16-6-13.1 
and 16-6-13.5 violate due process because no hearings are 
provided for in granting, denying, suspending or revoking 
local consent or in granting or denying a license by the 
Utah State Liquor Control Commission. In support of that 
contention, however, they refer to cases which are inap-
plicable to the present controversy. Hannah v. Larche, 363 
U. S. 420 (1960), held that hearings were not necessary 
in determinations by the Commission on Civil Rights be-
cause it was only a fact finding body. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 
395 U. S. 411 ( 1969), decided that hearings were necessary 
when the Louisiana Labor-Management Commission pub-
licly branded individuals as guilty of criminal violations. 
Morris v. Public Service Commission, 7 U. 2d 167, 321 P. 
2d 644 (1958), involved the revocation of a certificate of 
convenience and necessity to operate a common carrier. 
Neither the factuaJ situations of these cases nor the 
rules stated therein are analogous to the situation presented 
here involving liquor licenses, which have always been 
strictly regulated under the state's police power because of 
the potential danger to public health, safety and morals in-
volved in the sale of intoxicating liquors. 
(a) Due process does not mandate hearings under 
all circumstances. 
In Spurbeck v. Statton, 252 Iowa 279, 106 N. W. 2d 
660 (1960), a case involving revocation of a drivers' license, 
the court said : 
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The second major challenge to the validity of 
the act is that it provides for a denial of due process 
of law, because the license is suspended without 
notice or hearing. The exercise of the authority 
provided for must be sustained, if at all, as an ex-
ercise of the police power of the state. In Steinberg-
Baum & Co. v. Countryman, supra, page 931 of 247 
Iowa, page 19 of 77 N. W. 2d, we said: "The United 
States Supreme Court has frequently pointed out 
'the police power is not subject to any definite limi-
tations, but is co-extensive with the necessities of 
the case and the safeguards of the public interest.' " 
... The concept of due process of law does not 
necessarily and under all circumstances require no-
tice and hearing before official action -is taken. 
Wall v. King, 1 Cir., 206 F. 2d 878, 883; Yakus v. 
U. S., 321 U. S. 414, 442, 64 S. Ct. 660, 676, 88 L. 
Ed. 834. (Emphasis added.) 
There remains to consider the contention that the beer 
licenses are property and cannot be taken away from the 
licensee without notice and hearing. With this contention 
we cannot agree. Clearly the original Constitution did not 
deprive the states of their police power, which they might 
exercise for the protection of the public health, welfare, and 
morals. Bartemeyer v. State of Iowa, 85 U. S. 129, 18 Wall. 
129, 21 L. Ed. 929. The sale of nonintoxicating beer may 
be regulated by the state under its police power. No re-
straints were imposed upon the police power by the adop-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mugler v. State of 
Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 S. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205. Conse-
quently, ·when the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion was repealed by the Twenty-first Amendment, the 
constitutional law, except as to importations of liquor into 
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a state in violations of its laws, reverted to its condition 
prior to the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment. The 
police power of the states was unimpaired. Under that 
power, these licenses could be revoked. 
In 3 McQuillin, Municipal Corporation, Rev. 2d Ed., 
Section 1108, p. 714, the distinguished author said: 
* * * A license to carry on a business 
which affects health, safety, morals or the public 
welfare may be revoked by virtue of the police 
power. * * * 
Before revocation, in the absence of statutory 
or charter requirement, there is no necessity for 
notice or an opportunity to be heard, since the re-
vocation of a license is an administrative act. 
(Abeln v. City of Shakopee, 224 Minn. 262, 28 N. 
w. 2d 642 (1947) .) 
In Utah it is definitely established that the regulation of 
liquor is an exercise of the police power and the reasonable-
ness of the legislation is for the Legislature, not the courts, 
to determine. 
·when legislative action is within the scope of 
the police power, fairly debatable questions as to 
the reasonableness, wisdom, or propriety are not 
for the courts but for the Legislature. Standard Oil 
Co. v. Marysville, 279 U. S. 582, 49 S. Ct. 430, 73 
L. Ed. 856 . . . That the prohibition or regulation 
of the manufacture, transportation, sale, and use of 
alcohol and other intoxicating liquors is an exercise 
of the police power of the state admits of no doubt. 
(Utah Manufacturers Ass'n. v. Stewart, 82 U. 198, 
23 P. 2d 229 (1933) .) 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
40 
See, also, Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P. 2d 46, 91 Id. 
99 (1966); Payson St. Neighborhood Club v. Board of 
Liquor Licenses Com'r. for Baltimore City, 103 A. 2d 847, 
204 Md. 278 (1954). 
(b) A liquor license is only a "privilege" a·nd not a 
"right" within the meaning of the due process clause and 
hence hearings are not required. 
Among those activities regulated under the police 
power, the sale of liquor is unique and the courts have al-
lowed in this area even greater latitude with regard to 
traditional due process requirements because of its inher-
ent danger to society. Most states declare that a li-
cense to sell liquor is a privilege granted by the states 
and not "property" within the meaning of the due process 
clause. (See also Point II ( c), supra.) In Utah, the license 
to sell liquor has always been regarded as a privilege. In 
Utah Mfrs'. Assn. v. Stewart, 82 U. 198, 23 P. 2d 
229 (1933), this court said, in rejecting the contention 
that the liquor laws created an unconstitutional monopoly. 
It is equally well established that the sale of 
intoxicating liquors is peculiarly, on account of the 
evil effects resulting from their use, subject to leg-
islative control and regulation ... As we have be-
fore seen, the contract or property right of no citi-
zen is affected by such measure ... [W]hen the 
state bestows a privilege which is not a common, 
natural right, such as the right to engage in the 
liquor traffic, it may create a monopoly, and yet 
no right of the individual be violated. (Id., 82 U. 
198, 208.) 
In the case of Kent Club v. Toronto, 6 U. 2d 67, 305 P. 2d 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
46 
870 ( 1957), this court rejected the contention that the 
liquor law impaired the obligations of contract with similar 
"privilege" language, declaring: 
"They indeed have the same constitutional 
rights of property and contract as all other citizens, 
but they have no constitutional right to store and 
serve liquor on their premises. If they desire to 
continue to enjoy this privilege, they must so con-
duct their affairs as to comply with the legal regu-
lations pertaining thereto." 
In Yarbrough v. Montoya, 54 N. M. 91, 214 P. 2d 769 
(1950), the court upheld a denial of a liquor license by an 
administrative agency even though no formal hearing was 
had. Citing from an earlier case, the court said: 
Such license is a pr?'.vilege and not property 
'Within the rneaning of the rl,ue process and contract 
clauses of the constitutions of the State and the 
nation, and in them licensees have no vested prop-
erty rights. (Id., 214 P. 2d 769, 771.) 
A recent federal case from the 6th Circuit is in point. In 
Lewis v. City of Grand Rapids, 356 F. 2d 276 (6th Cir. 
1966), the court held : 
We hold only that neither the Fifth nor Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion required that the Grand Rapids City Commis-
sion hold a full "due process" hearing to consider 
plaintiff Lewis' request for the transfer to him of 
a license then owned by another. 
* * * 
Michigan's view that the character of the liquor 
business permits greater latitude in the means of 
its regulation than in the controls applied to other 
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activities was paralleled by the United States Su-
preme Court in Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 
86, 11 S. Ct. 13, 34 L. Ed. 620 ( 1890) . The court 
there said, 
"There is no inherent right in a citizen to thus 
sell intoxicating liquors by retail . " 
* * * 
The only inescapable rule of Crowley is that 
the denial of a hearing, in itself, would not violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment ... 
Indeed the District Judge here recognized the 
rules we speak of when he said, 
"We recognize the Michigan Supreme Court 
and the courts of other states have held consistently 
that the due process clause of the United States Con-
stitution does not apply to matters concerning liquor 
licenses." 222 F. Supp. 384. Such observation con-
forms to the great weight of authority. Anno. 35 
A. L. R. 2d 1067. (Id., pp. 285, 286.) 
Other cases that stand for the proposition that liquor 
licenses do not merit "property" status under the due pro-
cess clause include Kopper Kettle Restaurant, Inc. v. City 
of St. Robert, 439 S. W. 2d 1 (Mo. 1969); Barlotta v. Jef-
ferson Parish Council, 212 So. 2d 220 (La. App. 1968); In 
re Tahiti Bar, Inc., 186 Pa. Super. 214, 142 A. 2d 491 
(1958); Mumford v. Dept. of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 
65 Cal. Rptr. 495 (Cal. App. 1968); Hornstein v. Illinois 
Liquor Control Comm., 412 Ill. 365, 106 N. E. 2d 354 
(1952); Turner v. Miami, 160 Fla. 317, 34 So. 2d 551 
(1948); Premier-Pabst Sales Co. v. State Bd. of Equaliza-
tion, 13 F. Supp. 90 (D. C. Cal. 1935); Kaname Takaii v. 
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1082 (1937): Darby v. Pence, 17 Id. 697, 107 P. 484 (1910); 
Oval Bar & Restaurant, Inc. v. Bruckman, 177 Misc. 244, 
30 N. Y. S. 2d 394 (1941). Barlotta, Kopper Kettle, Tahiti 
Bar, Hornstein, Darby, Oval Bar, supra, dealt specifically 
with the lack of hearing provisions. 
In light of the above authorities, appellants' contention 
that "procedural safeguards are just as important to this 
property right [liquor license] as they are in the type of 
property right involved in Morris," is untenable. (Appel-
lants' brief, Point III, p. 25.) The authorities consistently 
distinguish between the manufacture, storage and sale of 
liquor and other businesses. Kent Club v. Toronto, supra; 
Lewis v. City of Grand Rapids, supra. Even the fact that 
a hearing is provided in one instance does not evidence a 
legislative recognition of a property right. The court in 
Lewis, supra, for example, noted that a hearing was re-
quired for revoking but not for the initial granting or de-
nying of a license. Certainly no property right was recog-
nized by the court there. In such a situation involving 
liquor, the providing for a hearing is "merely a matter of 
courtesy," Usdane v. Bruckman, (Sup.) 30 N. Y. S. 2d 396 
(1941). 
Accordingly, the receiving or maintaining a license to 
sell liquor is not a property right within the meaning of the 
due process clause. It is merely a privilege granted by the 
state pursuant to its police power. The potential dangers to 
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the public health, safety and morals inherent in the sale and 
consumption of liquor and the necessities of the situation 
justify the procedures here enacted by the Legislature for 
the protection of the people of Utah. The sections in ques-
tion do not violate due process. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants have no standing before the Court to 
challenge the statutes in question, because their rights have 
not been impaired nor threatened. The federal rights of 
appellants under the Fourth Amendment, made applicable 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, have not been 
abridged because their acceptance of a license under the 
liquor statutes constitutes a waiver of their right to insist 
upon a search warrant. Further, the nature of the search 
provided is reasonable under the police power of the state 
to regulate liquor distribution and consumption; and the 
sanctions imposed for refusing entry are not criminal, but 
civil in nature. The requirement of local consent properly 
leaves such matters to local officials whose acts are pre-
sumed to be reasonably exercised within constitutional lim-
its. Appellants have failed to allege or prove that their 
rights have in any way been violated or threatened. 
The absence of hearing procedures does not violate con-
stitutional due process standards because a liquor license 
granted by the state affords only a privilege and not a 
property right within the meaning of the due process clause. 
Each challenged statute is severable from the other in any 
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event and if any are found invalid, that would not require 
the entire Act to be declared invalid. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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